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THE MISGUIDED TRANSFORMATION OF
LOYALTY INTO CONTRACT

Reza Dibadj*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In a fiduciary relationship, the fiduciary is entrusted with discretion over the
beneficiary's assets. The relationship is a variation on the perennial principal-agent
problem. The fiduciary is an agent of the beneficiary and "within the scope of the
relationship, the fiduciary is to act in a disinterested manner in the beneficiary's best
interests."' Given the simple reality that "dependency or vulnerability of the beneficiary
is a classic component of any fiduciary relation" 2 and the "unavoidable fact that the
interests of the principal and the fiduciary are not perfectly aligned,",3 fiduciary law has
evolved to protect the beneficiary from possible abuses of the relationship by the
4
fiduciary.
The central problem in a fiduciary relationship is the potential "abuse of delegated
power." 5 More specifically, the risk is that the fiduciary-to whom discretion is
entrusted6-might place6 its interests above those of the beneficiary. 7 To try to protect

* Associate Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law. S.B., Harvard College; M.B.A.,
Harvard Business School; J.D., Harvard Law School. My thanks to the American Association of Law Schools
("AALS") Section on Agency, Partnership, LLCs & Unincorporated Businesses for giving me the opportunity
to present this article on January 5, 2006, at the AALS Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C.
1. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations,138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1675,
1676 (1990) (footnote omitted).
2. Claire Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate Concepts: FiduciaryDuties and
the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 111, 120 (1993).
3. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., JudicialReview of Fiduciary Decisionmaking--Some TheoreticalPerspectives,
80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1,4(1985).
4. See e.g. Dickerson, supra n. 2, at 116. For a discussion of some theoretical nuances embedded in
fiduciary law, see William W. Bratton, Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the Structure of Corporate
Fiduciary Law, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1084 (1993). In particular, Bratton asserts that "[fliduciary
relationships present a problem of legal classification. They lie in a gray area between the more clearly defined
worlds of government regulation and private ordering through contract." Id. at 1100.
5. Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 795, 832 (1983).
6. E.g. id. at 808-09 ("A central feature of fiduciary relations is that the fiduciary serves as a substitute for
the entrustor.... The power that the fiduciary obtains is originally vested in someone else, and is delegated to
the fiduciary not for his own use, but solely for the purpose of facilitating the performance of his functions.").
7. Id.at 809 ("[W]hile the fiduciary must be entrusted with power in order to perform his function, his
possession of the power creates a risk that he will misuse it and injure the entrustor."); D. Gordon Smith, The
CriticalResource Theory of FiduciaryDuty, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1399, 1497 (2002) ("Simply stated, the role of
fiduciary duty is to curb such self-interested behavior in the absence of complete specification of the
fiduciary's obligations.").
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against this risk, the duty of loyalty-which requires that the agent place the principal's9
duty.
interest ahead of its own 8-has historically been the most prominent fiduciary
As one commentator sums up: "[F]iduciary relationships form when one party (the
'fiduciary') acts on behalfof another party (the 'beneficiary') while exercising discretion
with respect to a criticalresource belonging to the beneficiary.... [T]he duty of loyalty
of fiduciary duty protects beneficiaries against opportunistic behavior
that is the essence
10
fiduciaries."
by
Unfortunately, the law of unincorporated associations is engaged in a misguided
march: it is transforming the duty of loyalty into a contractarian construct. This article
argues that these developments reflect doctrinal confusion, outworn economics, and
weak policy. If anything, the duty of loyalty needs to be strengthened, not watered
down.
Part II traces the evolution of the duty of loyalty in the law of unincorporated
associations. It begins with a discussion of the struggle between contractarianism and
fiduciary duty in the uniform laws promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the realm of partnerships, limited partnerships
("LP"), limited liability partnerships ("LLP"), and limited liability companies ("LLC").
It then shifts gears to the more squarely contractarian, and likely highly influential,
Delaware statutes covering the same business entities. The current state of the doctrine
suggests that precious little is left of the duty of loyalty. The law of unincorporated
businesses increasingly represents a series of default provisions in statutes that private
parties are free to contract around, unrestricted even by ex post judicial review through
the concept of fiduciary duty.
Part III argues that this has been a misguided transformation along three
dimensions. First, the move conflates fiduciary with contractual duties-notably, in
trying to replace an established duty of loyalty with weak and nebulous notions of good
faith. Second, it deploys outworn economic concepts reminiscent of the neoclassical
Chicago School. The economic justifications for contractarianism are based on facile
assumptions applied in a static manner; they do not represent real humans interacting in
real institutions over time. Third, the move from loyalty to contract brings with it a host
of public policy problems: it tries to toss out a well-developed legal tradition, it
downplays the role of trust and morality, and it ignores the role positive law can play in
shaping norms. In the end, the rise of contractarianism reflects a step backward to
nineteenth-century legal formalism and presents the risk that its faulty precepts may
spread further into corporate law.

8. For instance, in corporate law "the duty of loyalty mandates that the best interest of the corporation and
its shareholders takes precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder
and not shared by the stockholders generally." Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361
(Del. 1993).
9. Cf Dickerson, supra n. 2, at 118 ("[O]nly the duty of loyalty is undeniably a fiduciary duty, presumably
because it automatically satisfies the historical definition of fiduciary duty."). The other major duty typically
conceptualized as a fiduciary one is, of course, the duty of care. See e.g. ALI Principles of Corp. Governance
§ 4.01 (1992).
10. Smith, supra n. 7, at 1402 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).
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II.

A.

FROM LOYALTY TO CONTRACT

Uniform Laws

The past two decades have seen a spectacular proliferation of unincorporated
associations. In addition to general partnerships, there has emerged a veritable "alphabet
soup" of entities: LPs, LLPs, LLCs, and even limited liability limited partnerships.''

The emergence of these entities has been accompanied by the promulgation of several
uniform laws. Partnership law, stable since the development of the Uniform Partnership
Act ("UPA") in 1914, witnessed the introduction of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act

("RUPA") starting in 1992.12 For their part, LPs have been provided statutory guidance
through the Uniform Limited Partnership Act ("ULPA") beginning in 1916, which was
superseded by the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act ("RULPA") in 1976, as
amended in 1985, and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 2001 ("ULPA 2001").
Finally, the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act ("ULLCA"), promulgated in 1996,
guides LLCs.
Before analyzing why the march toward contractarianism is misguided, I will

briefly highlight the evolution of the uniform laws' position on the duty of loyalty.
Historically, UPA was essentially silent on fiduciary duties, 13 referring instead to the law
of agency.14 Given the sparseness of the statute, courts fashioned the duty of loyalty as a
15

matter of common law.
RUPA, however, is an entirely different story.

It narrows "[a] partner's duty of

loyalty to the partnership and the other partners' ' 1 6 to three items:
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit
derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up of the partnership business or derived

11. For an overview of these different entities, see Carter G. Bishop, UnincorporatedLimited Liability
Business Organizations:Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships,29 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 985, 993-1004
(1995). The limited liability limited partnership is perhaps the least known among these entities. In a nutshell,
it permits an LP to "eliminate the vicarious liability of general partners and, in some cases, also of limited
partners who participate in management." Larry E. Ribstein, The Evolving Partnership,26 J. Corp. L. 819, 839
(2001).
12. LLPs are typically governed through addenda included in the partnership statute. See e.g. RUPA
§§ 1001-1003, 6 U.L.A. 1 (2001); John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, A Call for a Unified Business
OrganizationLaw, 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1996) ("An LLP is a general partnership that is subject to
usually a one paragraph statutory provision restricting its liability if appropriate documentation is filed with a
state.").
13. The most directly relevant provision is UPA § 21, entitled "Partner Accountable as a Fiduciary," and
stating in relevant part only that
[e]very partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits
derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with the
formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property.
UPA § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 275 (2001).
14. The UPA stated: "The law of agency shall apply under this act." Id.at § 4(3). For a discussion of the
incomplete mapping of the law of agency to the duty of loyalty, see infra n. 115.
15. See e.g. Dickerson, supra n. 2, at 114 (noting that UPA's "wording specifically creates only the duty of
a partner to account for his or her profits derived directly from the partner's relationship with the partnership or
its assets. Nevertheless, the courts have extracted broad-based fiduciary duties, including particularly a duty of
loyalty, from that narrow language." (footnotes omitted)).
16. RUPA § 404(b).
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from a use by the partner of partnership property, including the appropriation of a
partnership opportunity;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or winding up of the
partnership business as or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership;
and
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the partnership
17
business before the dissolution of the partnership.
RUPA further provides that although the duty of loyalty cannot be eliminated, it may be
waived by agreement or upon disclosure and approval:
(i) the partnership agreement may identify specific types or categories of activities that do
not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable; or
(ii) all of the partners or a number or percentage specified in the partnership agreement
may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all material
facts, a specific act or
18
transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty.
Perhaps to try to show that it is compensating for its frugal view of loyalty, RUPA
does impose a good faith obligation on partners. 19 Like loyalty, this duty cannot be
eliminated entirely, but once again "the partnership agreement may prescribe the
standards by which the performance of the obligation is to be measured, ifthe standards
are not manifestly unreasonable."2 0 Finally, RUPA boldly declares that "[a] partner
does not violate a duty or obligation under [RUPA] or under the partnership agreement
21
merely because the partner's conduct furthers the partner's own interest."
The shift in approach from UPA to RUPA is nothing short of spectacular. As one
scholar has observed, RUPA "flatly rejects the existing collective loyalty
concept .... This shift is breathtaking. In one stroke of the pen the drafters have made
the partners adversaries." 22
Unfortunately, other uniform laws pertaining to
unincorporated associations have copied RUPA nearly verbatim.
In the world of LPs, ULPA and RULPA simply noted that the law of partnership
applied to the general partner. 23 Thus, a general partner in a UPA jurisdiction would

17. Id.; see Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct of
1992, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 523, 533 (1993). The duty of loyalty is also limited temporally. See e.g. RUPA
§ 603(b)(3) ("[T]he partner's duty of loyalty ...continue[s] only with regard to matters arising and events
occurring before the partner's dissociation, unless the partner participates in winding up the partnership's
business.").
18. RUPA § 103(b)(3).
19. Id. at § 404(d) ("A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and the other partners under this
[Act] or under the partnership agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith
and fair dealing." (bracket in original)).
20. Id. at § 103(b)(5) (emphasis added).
21. Id. at § 404(e) (bracket in original).
22. Vestal, supra n. 17, at 535 (footnote omitted); see also Allan W. Vestal, The DisclosureObligations of
Partners Inter Se under the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct of 1994: Is the ContractarianRevolution
Failing?36 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1559, 1614 (1995) [hereinafter Vestal, Disclosure Obligations].
23. RULPA § 403(a), 6A U.L.A. 125 (2003) ("Except as provided in this [Act] or in the partnership
agreement, a general partner of a limited partnership has the rights and powers and is subject to the restrictions
of a partner in a partnership without limited partners." (bracket in original)). By contrast, as one might expect,
"[a] limited partner does not have any fiduciary duty to the limited partnership or to any other partner solely by
reason of being a limited partner." ULPA 2001 § 305(a), 6A U.L.A. 1 (2003); see also id at cmt. subsec. (a)
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likely have greater fiduciary obligations than one in a RUPA jurisdiction. ULPA 2001,
however, is a self-contained statute 24 that must, therefore, express a vision of fiduciary
duties. Its pattern precisely mimics RUPA: cabin loyalty to the same three items as in
RUPA, 25 allowing waivers of loyalty by agreement as long as they are "not manifestly
unreasonable," 26 imposing a duty of good faith 27 that the partners may define provided
their standards are "not manifestly unreasonable," 2 8 and declaring that a partner can
pursue his own interest without violating any fiduciary obligations. 29 Put succinctly,
ULPA 2001 "eschews the UPA's open-ended approach to general partner fiduciary
RUPA's provision on fiduciary duty and the
duties and incorporates essentially verbatim
30
obligation of good faith and fair dealing."
Unsurprisingly, ULLCA follows RUPA as well. The duty of loyalty of LLC
members extends only to the now familiar three items31 that can be waived as long as the
waiver is "not manifestly unreasonable." 32 The duty of good faith3 3 can also be defined
by the parties as long as their standards are "not manifestly unreasonable." 34 And, of
course ULLCA provides that "[a] member of a member-managed company does not
violate a duty or obligation under [ULLCA] or under the operating agreement merely
because the member's conduct furthers the member's own interest." 3 5 As the old saying
goes, it is ddjA vu all over again.
Two patterns emerge from this brief survey of the new uniform laws: RUPA,
ULPA 2001, and ULLCA. The first, and most obvious, is a sharp departure away from
fiduciary duties toward contractarianism. As one commentator summarizes in the
context of RUPA:
Essentially, this new language permits the parties to enter into a valid, enforceable
agreement that would remove, prospectively, virtually any duty of loyalty. The agreement
would be valid as long as it does not violate [an] attenuated obligation of good faith and
fair dealing; describes categories of permitted activities; and as long as it is not otherwise
manifestly unreasonable. The burden of proving a violation has shifted to the complaining

("Under this Act, limited partners have very limited power of any sort in the regular activities of the limited
partnership and no power whatsoever justifying the imposition of fiduciary duties to the limited partnership or
fellow partners.").
24. Daniel S. Kleinberger, A User's Guide to the New Uniform Limited PartnershipAct, 37 Suffolk U. L.
Rev. 583, 609 (2004) (commenting that ULPA 2001's "most fundamental change consists of replacing a linked
statute with a stand alone statute."); Larry E. Ribstein, FiduciaryDuties and Limited PartnershipAgreements,
37 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 927, 961 (2004) ("ULPA 2001's most significant contribution is its 'de-linkage' from
general partnership law.").
25. ULPA 2001 § 408(b).
26. Id. at § 110(b)(5)(A).
27. Id. at § 408(d).
28. Id. at § I I0(b)(7).
29. Id. at § 408(e).
30. Klcinberger, supra n. 24, at 608.
31. ULLCA § 409(b), 6A U.L.A. 553 (2003).
32. Id. at § 103(b)(2)(i).
33. Id. at § 409(d).
34. Id. at § 103(b)(4).
35. Id. at § 409(e).
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Are we

The second, somewhat subtler pattern is the remaining struggle to maintain some notion
of fiduciary duty in statutes otherwise beset by contractarianism. 37 While some critics
38
contend that the mention of any residual fiduciary obligations is merely a fagade, 39
contractarians believe that the uniform laws have still not gone far enough.
Notwithstanding this residual and contradictory impulse, it is amply clear that the
uniform laws of unincorporated associations have been moving away from "traditional
standards and substituting fiduciary duties with a narrower scope and less demanding
'
substance. AO
B.

Delaware'sApproach

Delaware-already having won the race for incorporations 4 1 --does not suffer
from even a trace of ambivalence, especially after its laws were amended in 2004. The
Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("DRUPA") declares boldly that "[i]t is the
policy of [DRUPA] to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and
to the enforceability of partnership agreements, ' A2 while freeing itself of any vestiges of
the common law. 43 It then provides:
A partnership agreement may provide for the limitation or elimination of any and all
liabilities for breach of contract and breach of duties (including fiduciary duties) of a
partner or other person to a partnership or to another partner or to another person that is a
party to or is otherwise bound by a partnership agreement; provided, that a partnership
a bad
agreement may not limit or eliminate liability for any act or omission that constitutes
44
dealing.
fair
and
faith
good
of
covenant
contractual
implied
the
of
violation
faith
In other words, the duty of loyalty may simply be waived; instead, the duty of good faith

36. Dickerson, supra n. 2, at 146-47.
37. See e.g. ULLCA § 103 cmt. ("To the extent not otherwise mentioned in subsection (b), every section of
this Act is simply a default rule, regardless of whether the language of the section appears to be otherwise
mandatory.... Under subsections (b)(2) to (4), an irreducible core of fiduciary responsibilities survive any
contrary provision in the operating agreement."); see also Sandra K. Miller, What Standardsof Conduct Should
Apply to Members and ManagersofLimited Liability Companies? 68 St. John's L.Rev. 21, 65 (1994).
38. E.g. Vestal, supran. 17, at 551 ("Having adopted the contractarian premise, however wrong it might be,
the statute is misleading in giving the appearance of being faithful to the fiduciary-based history of partnership
law. In reality, the proposal is a radical departure from existing law and it should be labeled as such."
(footnotes omitted)).
39. E.g. Ribstein, supran. 24, at 962 ("The main problem with RUPA/ULPA 2001 lies in their restrictions
on waiver." (footnote omitted)).
40. Smith, supra n. 7, at 1485 (footnote omitted); see also Claire Moore Dickerson, Equilibrium
Destabilized:FiduciaryDuties Under the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 25 Stetson L.Rev. 417, 448
(1995); Allan W.Vestal, "'Assumea RatherLarge Boat... ":The Mess We Have Made of PartnershipLaw, 54
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 487, 531-32 (1997) ("[T]he well-established outlines show us a range of fiduciary duties
that starts out as statutory and exclusive, restrictively defined and temporally limited, and is then broadly
amendable. The precise range of options to which the partners may bargain is not well settled, but the power is
certainly broad." (footnotes omitted)).
41. See Reza Dibadj, DelayeringCorporate Law, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 469 (2005).
42. Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 15-103(d) (2005).
43. Id. at § 15-1201 ("The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed
shall have no application to this chapter.").
44. ld.at § 15-103(f).
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is introduced. The Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act ("DRULPA")
proceeds in analogous fashion. It states that freedom of contract shall govern, 45 frees
itself from the common law,4 6 and provides that the duty of loyalty can simply be
waived. 4 7 As in DRUPA, a non-waivable duty of good faith is simultaneously
introduced.48 Predictably, the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act ("DLLCA")
follows exactly the same three steps: extolling freedom of contract,4 9 untethering the
statute from the common law,5 ° and allowing loyalty but not good faith to be waived.5 I
Of course, Delaware's approach is not the only one, and the proliferation of new
unincorporated associations 52 is accompanied by vast differences in statutory approaches
among states in their regulation of each of these entities. 53 Commentators have lamented
the "increasingly vast and disjointed realm so cumbersome and abstruse as to confound
all but the most die-hard business law scholars and practitioners." 54 An additional piece
to the puzzle, however, should fuel convergence. Given that unincorporated businesses,
like corporations, can choose what state law will govern their "internal affairs," a race is
likely to develop among states to attract filings of unincorporated associations.5 5 If the
history of corporate law is any indication, Delaware is likely to win this race by
loosening mandatory restrictions on businesses created under its laws. 5 6 Indeed, this is
precisely the approach that DRUPA, DRULPA, and DLLCA have taken.
As a consequence, the unabashed contractarianism of the Delaware statute-rather
than the more guarded contractarianism of the uniform laws-is likely to emerge as the
de facto "national" law of unincorporated associations. Contractarians, much to their

45. Id. at § 17-1101(c).
46. Id. at§ 17-1101(b).
47. Del. Code Ann. tit.
6, § 17-1101 (f).
48. Id.
49. Id. at § 18-1101 (b).
50. Id. at§ 18-1101(a).
51. Id. at§ 18-1101(e).
52. Over time, there will likely be a convergence among forms toward the LLC, which offers both
pass-through taxation and limited liability. As Allan Vestal observes: "Apart from statutory restrictions on
some businesses being carried on in the limited liability partnership form, quirky tax provisions, and outdated
governmental regulations, it is difficult to conceive of a reason why knowledgeable and well-represented
participants would organize a firm as a general partnership or a limited partnership." Vestal, supra n. 40,
at 515 (footnotes omitted).
53. E.g. David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How Should
Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities
Regulationfor the Limited Liability Company? 51 Okla. L. Rev. 427, 470 (1998) ("[I]t is barely possible to talk
of the LLC as a uniform entity, because there is very little legal uniformity."); Sandra K. Miller, The Role of
the Court in Balancing ContractualFreedom with the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and
Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1609, 1624-25 (2004).
54. Matheson & Olson, supran. 12, at 3; see Vestal, supra n. 40, at 488 ("It is also a measure of failure that
we are seeing a breakdown in uniformity of the law of unincorporated firms.").
55. See e.g. Allan W. Vestal, Choice of Law and the Fiduciary Duties of Partners Under the Revised
Uniform PartnershipAct, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 219, 247-48 (1994) ("[Tjhe plenary choice of law power under the
Revised Act is a predicate for the development of a market in partnership law which could parallel the market
in corporation law."). For a discussion of choice of law and the "internal affairs" doctrine, as well as some
observations on the perennial "race to the top" versus the "race to the bottom" debate in corporate law, see
Dibadj, supra n. 41, at 473-82, 518-20.
56. See generally Gregory A. Mark, Some Observationson Writing the Legal History of the Corporationin
the Age of Theory, in Progressive Corporate Law 67, 77 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., Westview Press 1995)
("[R]estrictions on managerial discretion have been either eliminated or relaxed over time.").
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delight, point out that "the combination of the Delaware statute and the expansion of
enforcement of contractual choice of law suggests that truly mandatory fiduciary duties
transforming mandatory fiduciary duties
are virtually a dead issue."5 7 Unfortunately,
58
into a "dead issue" is a bad idea.
III.

A MISGUIDED

TRANSFORMATION

The transformation from loyalty to contract has been misguided along three
dimensions. It muddles doctrine, espouses antiquated economics, and reflects poor
public policy.
A.

DoctrinalConfusion
Fiduciary duties and contracts are two different things.

While a more nuanced

contract theory may represent an improvement over the current legal regime, it too is left
wanting.
1.

Transposing Contract

The transformation of loyalty into contract exhibits doctrinal confusion when it
equates partnerships to contracts.

Larry Ribstein, a leading and eloquent contractarian

voice, argues that "because partnerships, like other business associations, clearly are
59
Ribstein then proceeds
voluntary relationships, contracts inevitably will hold sway."

to argue that "[t]iduciaryduties are a type of contract term that applies, in the absence of
a contrary agreement, where an 'owner' who controls and derives the residual benefit

from property delegates
60

open-ended

management

power over

property to a

'manager."'

Unfortunately, transforming fiduciary obligations into waivable contractual terms
is simply inconsistent with a long-standing understanding of what fiduciary duties are.
Fiduciary law is different than contract law along several crucial dimensions. As Tamar
Frankel outlines:

57. Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in UnincorporatedFirms, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 537,
589 (1997) (footnote omitted); cf Vestal, supra n. 55, at 271 ("It would be a hollow victory indeed for a state
to prevail on the underlying policy question, adopting a fiduciary-based partnership law, only to have
partnerships use the less prominent amendment and choice of law provisions to evade the fiduciary rules.").
58. Interestingly, mandatory limited liability seems to suit the contractarians just fine. Cf Douglas M.
Branson, The Death of Contractarianism and the Vindication of Structure and Authority in Corporate
Governance and CorporateLaw, in Progressive Corporate Law, supra n. 56, at 93, 93 ("One mandatory
feature of the legal landscape the contractarians would retain is the limited liability of corporations."
(footnote omitted)).
59. Ribstein, supra n. 1I, at 848; see also id. at 822. This argument is analogous to the one contractarians
have made in the corporate context. See e.g. William W. Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor
to CorporateLaw's Duty of Loyalty, in ProgressiveCorporate Law, supra n. 56, at 139, 149 ("The contract
paradigm asserts that corporations are constituted entirely of contracts resulting from the voluntary and
purposeful interaction of rational actors in a competitive environment."). For a discussion of why the
corporation cannot be analyzed simply as contract, see Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1459 (2005).
60. Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 209, 215 (2005) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Ribstein, Are PartnersFiduciaries?];see also Ribstein, supra n. 24, at 965 ("Fiduciary duties in
business associations should be regarded as default rules that work together with, and can be displaced by,
explicit provisions of the contract."); cf Vestal, supra n. 40, at 512-13.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol41/iss3/4

8

Dibadj: The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty into Contract

2006]

MISGUIDED TRANSFORMATION OFLOYALTY

First, because fiduciary law is aimed at reducing the entrustors' risks, the law regulates
mostly the fiduciaries. Contract law regulates both parties equally.
Second, although most types of fiduciary relationships are grounded in the consent of
both parties, fiduciary law is triggered primarily by the consent of the fiduciary to
serve.... Contracts require, in all cases, the consent of all parties.
Third, fiduciary law is easily applicable because entry into fiduciary relationships
involves low costs, requiring no formalities or special conditions. These requisites are far
less formal than the requisites for contract.
Fourth, because fiduciary law addresses the entrustors' risks from relationships, the
rules dictate how fiduciaries should behave. Contract rules are far less intrusive.
Fifth, because entrustors' risks from the relationship vary, fiduciary rules that address
these risks vary more than contract rules.
Sixth, the focus on the entrustor's potential harm from the relationship explains the
ascendancy of fiduciary rules over other legal arrangements. Because the private
deemed sufficient to
arrangements and other rules that govern the relationships are not
61
protect entrustors, fiduciary law is superimposed on the other rules.
As Frankel summarizes, "[t]he main difference between the two systems revolves
around the right of one party to rely on the other. Entrustors are entitled to rely on their
fiduciaries to a greater extent than contracting parties are entitled to rely on each
other.' 62 The difference is stark-"In the world of contract, self-interest is the norm,
and restraint must be imposed by others. In contrast, the altruistic posture of fiduciary
law requires that once an individual undertakes to act as a fiduciary, he should act to
63
It follows that "[o]nce a
further the interests of another in preference to his own."
its
legal consequences are
relation is established, . . . its classification as fiduciary and
64
Indeed, "[a]rguably, the very
primarily determined by the law rather than the parties."
request by a fiduciary for waiver of his duties could constitute a violation of these
65
duties."
Given these substantial differences, it is a testimony to the power of contractarian
rhetoric that its supporters have been able to muddy the boundary between fiduciary law
and contract law. 66 Contractarians have additionally been brilliant in their ability to
anticipate potential fears that might emerge as a consequence of their anemic conception
of loyalty. Their addition of the duty of "good faith and fair dealing" to the doctrine of
67
Unfortunately, good
unincorporated associations is another rhetorical masterstroke.

61. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1209, 1225-26 (1995) (footnotes
omitted).

at 1223.
62. Id. at 1276; see also id.
63. Frankel, supran. 5, at 830.
64. Id. at 820.
65. Frankel, supra n. 61, at 1230.

66. Cf Vestal, supra n. 17, at 550 ("The initial question is whether the duty of loyalty set forth in the
Revised Act should be labeled 'fiduciary' at all." (footnote omitted)). A similar linguistic feat occurred when
the Chicago School masterfully redefined "consumer welfare" in antitrust law to mean overall allocative
efficiency. See Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. Colo. L. Rev. 745, 749-55 (2004).
67. See supra pt. It; see also Ribstein, supra n. 57, at 594 ("[T]he parties should be able to alter default
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faith-to the extent it can even be defined meaningfully-is a different concept from
loyalty.
To begin with, "good faith and fair dealing" is a contractual term designed for
relationships characterized by self-interest, not dependency. The comments to the
68
uniform laws themselves plainly state that good faith is not a fiduciary obligation;
rather, it is derived from the Uniform Commercial Code. 69 As one commentator points
out, there are myriad differences between fiduciary obligations and good faith:
[The] primary differences between fiduciary duties and the standard of good faith and fair
dealing turn upon the ability to act in a self-interested manner, the computation of
damages, the presumption that the parties operate on an equal footing, and the presence or
70
absence of an imperative to further the beneficiary's interests.

Moreover, Frankel observes,
[iun no sense are fiduciary relations and the risks they create for the entrustor similar to
adhesion contracts or unfair bargains. The relation may expose the entrustor to risk even if
he is sophisticated, informed, and able to bargain effectively. Rather, the entrustor's
vulnerability stems from the structure and nature of the fiduciary relation. The delegated
power that enables the fiduciary to benefit the entrustor also enables him to injure the
entrustor, because the purpose for which the fiduciary is allowed to use his delegated
power is narrower than the purposes for which he is capable of using that power.71

As though these striking differences were not enough, the obligation of good faith
must necessarily remain cabined within the terms of the contract. 72 Gordon Smith notes
the duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to adjust her behavior on an ongoing basis to
avoid self-interested behavior that wrongs the beneficiary. By contrast, the implied
obligation of good faith and fair dealing requires loyalty to the other contracting party only
to the extent that the terms of the contractual relationship reasonably contemplate the
73
actions inquestion.

Smith continues, it is the added discretion a fiduciary has "that justifies the imposition of
duties in their agreements as long as they are held to good faith compliance with their contracts.").
Contractarians have tried the same rhetorical maneuver in corporate law. See e.g. Dickerson, supran. 2, at 133
("[B]ecause the contractarians believe that a corporation is a nexus of contracts, it is logical that they would
apply classic contract law concepts of good faith and fair dealing. Just as good faith is not waivable in contract
law, it would be the mandatory core duty in corporate law." (footnotes omitted)).
68. E.g. RUPA § 404 cmt. 4 ("The obligation of good faith and fair dealing is a contract concept, imposed
on the partners because of the consensual nature of a partnership. It is not characterized, in RUPA, as a
fiduciary duty arising out of the partners' special relationship." (citation omitted)); ULPA 2001 § 305 cmt.
subsec. (b) ("The obligation of good faith and fair dealing is not a fiduciary duty, does not command altruism
or self-abnegation, and does not prevent a partner from acting in the partner's own self-interest." (emphasis in
original)).
69. E.g. RUPA § 103 cmt. 7 ("The language of subsection (b)(5) is based on UCC Section 1-102(3). The
partners can negotiate and draft specific contract provisions tailored to their particular needs ... ,but blanket
waivers of the obligation are unenforceable." (citations omitted)).
70. Miller, supran. 37, at 56; see also Dickerson, supra n. 2, at 119 ("[T]he requirement of good faith may
coexist with self-interest, and need not contain the dependency feature of fiduciary duties."); Kleinberger,
supra n. 24, at 636 (quoting ULPA 2001 § 305 cmt. subsec. (b)).
71. Frankel, supran. 5, at 810 (emphasis in original).
72. In a similar vein, good faith is limited temporally. See e.g. Vestal, supra n. 55, at 242 ("[Tlhe
nonfiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing under the Revised Act simply does not apply to
prepartnership conduct." (footnote omitted)).
73. Smith, supran. 7, at 1409-10 (footnote omitted).
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74
more stringent loyalty obligations on fiduciaries than mere contracting parties."
Thus, scholars are quite correct to question the status of good faith as a fiduciary
duty, 75 and lament that "[i]t is contractarian confusion to equate the fiduciary duties of
the common law and the UPA with the Uniform Commercial Code." 76 To boot, if good
faith is a background obligation inherent in contract, then one might plausibly argue that
77
it is redundant even to mention it in the statutes governing unincorporated associations.

The explanation for good faith's inclusion, however, might be quite simple: it has been
put in as a rhetorical tool to assuage concerns about the decline of fiduciary duties. As
one observer noted in the corporate context, "the emerging duty of good faith is best
understood as a rhetorical device rather than a substantive standard. ' 78 The same
79
phenomenon has replicated itself in the world of unincorporated associations.
Assuming, arguendo, that one can overcome this fundamental dissonance, "good
faith and fair dealing" is difficult to define. For example, will good faith be a subjective
standard? 80
Will it be analyzed as a hypothetical outside the context of actual
partnership relations? 8 1 RUPA's comments modestly admit that "[t]he meaning of
'good faith and fair dealing' is not firmly fixed under present law." 82 And commentators
confirm that "[i]t is not yet clear what meaning the courts will attach to the phrase; it is
not defined in RUPA or the commentary." 83 Even contractarians admit as much.84
To the extent that good faith can be defined, it will very likely set a very high threshold
before relief will be granted, especially given that partners are expressly allowed to
85
further their own interests.
New developments in corporate law suggest that a showing of bad faith likely

74. Id. at 1448; see also id. at 1410 ("[F]iduciaries are expected to be much more scrupulous about their
self-interested behavior than mere contracting parties.").
75. E.g. Dickerson, supra n. 2, at 133.
76. Vestal, supran. 17, at 543-44.
77. The one possible difference, at least in the uniform laws, is that the waiver of good faith standards
cannot be "manifestly unreasonable." E.g. RUPA § 103(b)(3)(i); see Dickerson, supra n. 2, at 145 ("This is not
the pure contractarian model only if and to the extent that the RUPA good faith threshold, by requiring
identification of standards not 'manifestly unreasonable,' is higher than the contract law standard."); supra
n. 18 and accompany text.
78. Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law
Jurisprudence,55 Duke L.J. 1, 6 (2005).
79. Contractarians similarly transpose unconscionability, another doctrine from contract law. See e.g.
Kathleen D. Fuentes, Student Author, Limited Liability Companies and Opting-Out of Liability: A New
Standardfor Fiduciary Duties? 27 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1023, 1057-62 (1997); Larry E. Ribstein, From
Efficiency to Politics in ContractualChoice of Law, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 363, 464 (2003).
80. See Vestal, Disclosure Obligations,supra n. 22, at 1610-12.
81. See id.
82. RUPA § 404 cmt. 4.
83. Vestal, supran. 40, at 511 (footnotes omitted); see Kleinberger, supra n. 24, at 635-36.
84. E.g. Elisa Feldman, Student Author, Your Partner'sKeeper: The Duty of Good Faithand FairDealing
under the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct, 48 SMU L. Rev. 1931, 1958 (1995); Robert M. Phillips, Student
Author, Good Faith and Fair Dealing under the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1179,
1218 (1993); Ribstein, Are PartnersFiduciaries?supra n. 60, at 221 ("The most difficult aspect of defining
fiduciary duties involves distinguishing these duties from the general obligation of 'good faith."'). A similar
problem remains in the corporate law context. Griffith, supra n. 78, at 29 ("[Tihe precise meaning of good
faith remains unclear.").
85. E.g. RUPA § 404(e); Vestal, supra n. 17, at 553 ("Paralleling the demise of the original fiduciary
formulation was the insertion and expansion of language legitimating the unrestricted pursuit of self-interest.");
see supra n. 21 and accompanying text.
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requires intentional wrongdoing. In the recent and highly publicized Walt Disney
decision, 86 the Delaware Court of Chancery held "the concept of intentionaldereliction
of duty, a conscious disregardfor one's responsibilities,is an appropriate (although not

the only) standard for determining whether fiduciaries have acted in good faith." 8 7
Using the good faith standard is thus likely to require a showing of intent-hardly an
easy standard to meet. Yet, none of this should come as a surprise: to the extent that
good faith is a contractual concept, then caveat emptor of classical contract law
88

applies.
Yet another problem with the statutes is that they gloss over a fundamental
question: To whom or what is the duty of loyalty owed? For instance, RUPA speaks of a
partner's duties "to the partnership and the otherpartners,' 89 and DRUPA mentions the
duties of "a partner or other person to a partnershipor to anotherpartner or to another
person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a partnershipagreement."90 Neither

the uniform nor the Delaware laws, however, discuss the differences among duties owed
91
to an entity and those owed to the other enumerated individuals.
Historically, it might have made sense to include duties to individuals since
partnerships were considered an aggregate of individual partners rather than independent
entities. 92 Today, however, a cynic might be forgiven for wondering whether the gloss
is purposeful, in an age where unincorporated entities are conceptualized as distinct
entities. After all, mixing duties owed to the entity with those owed to other partners
makes the general partnership, LP, LLP, or LLC seem more like a simple contract among
individuals than a distinct entity to whom loyalty is owed. 93 Conveniently, this

86. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005). The Delaware Supreme Court
has upheld the Chancery Court's opinion. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 2006 WL 1562466 (Del.
June 8, 2006).
87. Disney, 907 A.2d at 755 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted); cf Bratton, supra n. 4, at 1124
(noting that the good faith norm "asks materially less of corporate actors than does the fiduciary fairness
norm."). A similar situation has emerged in the law of close corporations. See Mitchell, supra n. 1, at 1680
("[F]iduciary analysis in close corporation law has moved in three stages from the strict application of
standards of loyalty, to judicial balancing of the legitimate interests of controlling shareholders with those of
the minority, to the contemporary treatment of breach of fiduciary duty as intentional wrongful conduct."
(footnote omitted)). For more on fiduciary duties in close corporations, see infra nn. 136-139 and
accompanying text.
88. Cf Frankel, supra n. 61, at 1230 ("The distinction between entitlement to trust in fiduciary, law and
caveat emptor in contract law explains the different processes governing waiver of obligations.").
89. RUPA § 404(b) (emphasis added). Similarly, ULPA 2001 discusses a general partner's duties "to the
limited partnership and the other partners." ULPA 2001 § 408(b) (emphasis added). ULLCA refers to a
member's duties "to a member-managed company and its other members." ULLCA § 409(b) (emphasis
added).
90. Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 15-103(f) (emphasis added). Similarly, DRULPA speaks of the duties "of a
partner or other person to a limited partnershipor to anotherpartner or to an otherperson that is a party to or
is otherwise bound by a partnership agreement." Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 17-1101(f) (emphasis added).
DLLCA discusses the duties "of a member, manager or other person to a limited liability company or to
anothermember or manageror to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a limited liability
company agreement." Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-1101(e) (emphasis added).
91. See Kleinberger, supra n. 24, at 634 ("The reference to 'the other partners' [in ULPA 2001] is
misleading, however, because none of the listed rules say anything about partner-to-partner relations.").
92. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) ("Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to
one another,while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty." (emphasis added)).
93. Cf Robert W. Hillman, The Bargain in the Firm: Partnership Law, Corporate Law, and Private
Ordering within Closely-Held Business Associations, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 171, 190 (2005) ("Emphasis on the
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contractual bias dovetails nicely with the promotion of the contractual duty of good faith
and fair dealing over the fiduciary duty of loyalty. 94 Not to mention, it might appear
onerous to impose mandatory duties toward both entities and individuals. Most
importantly, such a stance also sidesteps debate as to whether imposing a non-waivable
95
duty of loyalty solely toward the entity would be simpler and equally effective.
2.

More Nuanced Contract Theory?

One way out might be sophisticated contract theory. Distinguished scholars have
put forth various proposals. For example, Frankel contemplates a regime where a strict
set of procedures would need to be followed before fiduciary duties can be waived:
[E]ntrustors may only waive fiduciary duties owed to them if they follow a two-step
procedure.
First, entrustors must be put on clear notice that, with respect to the particular duties
that they waive, they can no longer rely on their fiduciaries; instead, the entrustors must
fend for themselves. Second, the fiduciaries must provide entrustors with information
acquired by virtue of their position as fiduciaries
to enable entrustors to make an informed
96
independent decision regarding the waiver.

Meanwhile, in seeking a middle ground between contractarian and fiduciary
perspectives in corporate law, John Coffee argues that a series of trustworthy opt-out
procedures be established,9 7 that "where major deviations from the traditional norms of
corporate governance are to be adopted... the corporation should be required to sustain
the burden of proving that the amendment was not against public policy," 98 and even
that the level of scrutiny applied to the opt-out depends on when it occurs during the
lifecycle of the firm. 99 Going a step further, Mark Loewenstein suggests bifurcating the
law of business associations: "The contractarian viewpoint ought to find its expression in
alternatives to incorporation, which ought to provide maximum freedom of

relationship among partners, rather than the relationship between an entity and its owners, supports private
ordering rather than mandatory rules as the basis for firm governance.").
94. In corporate law, "[h]istorically, the duty of loyalty is owed to the corporate entity and covers conduct
pursued in a corporate capacity." Bratton, supra n. 4, at 1092. On the other hand, the "duty of fair dealing"as developed under the ALl Principles of Corporate Governance--"is owed to both the corporation and its
shareholders." Id. at 1093 (footnote omitted); see also ALl Principles of Corp. Governance pt. V,
at introductory n. b (1994).
95. As one commentator sums up in the corporate context,
[t]he group comprises only the shareholders ...brought together to achieve a common purpose,
which is to operate a successful business. The interests of the group, therefore, are the interests of
the business, and it is the business that the corporate organ must seek to advance and protect.
Corporate fiduciary duty principles generally reflect this understanding.
Paula J. Dalley, To Whom It May Concern: Fiduciary Duties and Business Associations, 26 Del. J. Corp. L.
515,559-60 (2001).
96. Frankel, supra n. 61, at 1212.
97. John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation,and the Special
Case of Remedies, 53 Brook. L. Rev. 919, 973 (1988) ("The intermediate position is to develop a multiplicity
of model forms, all carrying a reputable brand name.").
98. Id.at 972 (footnote omitted).
99. Id.at 924 ("[A]ttempts to opt out from the 'default' rules of corporate governance look very different
(and more suspicious) if they occur at midstream (and are to be effected by charter amendment) than if such
opting out occurs at the formation of the firm.").
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contract.... Under this approach, corporations would remain entities with certain
immutable mandatory terms; all other business entities would be contractarian in
10 0
nature."
While these proposals are thought-provoking and might represent an improvement
over our current regime, trying to extricate partnerships from fiduciary analysis-no
matter what the mechanism-is problematic. Lawrence Mitchell writes:
The issue of the nature of partnership often has been described as one of a contract model
versus a fiduciary model. The dominant conclusion that partnership is contractual appears
to be taken to exclude the fiduciary. ... But, if I may be so direct, this is a ridiculous
conclusion. All fiduciary relationshipsoriginatein some form of consent, and nearly all of
those that involve property or commerce are contractual.... Thus, the fact that the

partnership relationship is essentially contractual says absolutely nothing about the
obligations and consequences of that relationship,
other than that it is voluntary. To
10
conclude anything further is utter nonsense. 1
Similarly, William Bratton warns of the "contractarian conjuring trick that turns positive
law into contract and protective norms into ex ante bargains." 102 No matter how
nuanced the contract theory, this logical inconsistency cannot be ducked.103
B.

Outworn Economics

Beyond its doctrinal confusion, a curious feature of contractarianism is the
assertion among its proponents that it fits nicely within the precepts of modem
economics. To their credit, the more sophisticated contractarians at least outline their
economic assumptions. For instance, Larry Ribstein argues that "[a]s long as this choice
relies on contracts between parties who are motivated to act in their own interests,
bargain freely, and internalize the costs and benefits of the deal, enforcing contractual
choice produces 'Pareto' wealth maximization."' 104 Unfortunately, such assumptionstypical of neoclassical law and economics of Chicago School fame-are heroic. Among
other ills, they ignore externalities, pay little attention to bargaining realities, and are
based on a static analysis of business relationships. Not to mention, they ignore
transaction costs and institutional realities. 105 If anything, this economic approach
100. Mark J. Loewenstein, A New Directionfor State Corporate Codes, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 453, 471
(1997); cf Frankel, supra n. 61, at 1267-68 ("I believe that law should provide society with two models for
financial and economic interactions: the model of fiduciary relationship representing trust and dependency; and
the model of contract relationship representing mutual suspicion, 'realistic' mistrust, and independence.").
101. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Naked Emperor: A Corporate Lawyer Looks at RUPA's Fiduciary
Provisions, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 465,469 (1997) (emphasis in original).
102. Bratton, supra n. 59, at 167-68.
103. See also Frankel, supra n. 61, at 1211 ("When we blur the distinctions between fiduciary and contract
relationships, calling them by the same name, we tend to disregard the reasons for the different rules that
govern them. Having forgotten these reasons, we are proposing seriously flawed rules that could come back to
haunt us.").
104. Ribstein, supran. 79, at 395; see also id at 450.
105. Below, I focus on the intersection of neoclassical economics and the law of unincorporated
associations. For a more general critique of conventional law and economics, as well as a discussion of new
approaches, see Dibadj, supra n. 66; Reza Dibadj, Beyond FacileAssumptions and Radical Assertions: A Case
for "Critical Legal Economics, " 2003 Utah L. Rev. 1155 (2003). For a new approach to welfare economics,
including a detailed analysis of Pareto optimality, see Reza Dibadj, Weasel Numbers, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1325
(2006).
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represents a throwback to pre-realist legal formalism.
1.

Externalities, Bargains, and Time

First, organizing business associations solely by means of private contract
conveniently ignores externalities. As new research on private legal systems shows
[g]ovemmental intervention... may be crucial to mitigating degradation because
private legal systems are at a disadvantage compared to the government in punishing
degradation.

The government may also be an efficient regulator when degradation creates
of the private
legal system, and for
are not constituents
externalities that harm •persons who
.
•1
06
whose interests, therefore, the private legal system might not cater.
Put more concretely in the context of business associations, organization via private
contract allows more sophisticated "insiders"-for example, general partners in LPs or
manager-members in LLCs-to impose externalities on their partners and co-members
07
who might face imperfect information and a host of collective action problems.]
Second, contractarians present an idealized vision of the bargaining principle and
do not contemplate a dynamic analysis of firm behavior over time. Assuming equal
10 8
bargaining power and informational symmetry among parties is unrealistic.
As Melvin Eisenberg points out, "[t]he bargain principle is based partly on the
proposition that a fully informed party is the best judge of his own utility. If a party is
not fully informed, or lacks the sophistication to understand the implications of his
bargain, the bargain principle loses some or all of its force." 10 9 Not to mention,

106. Amitai Aviram & Avishalom Tor, Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing, 55 Ala. L. Rev.
231, 274-75 (2004) (footnote omitted); see also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual PropertyRights and StandardSetting Organizations,90 Cal. L. Rev. 1889, 1971-72 (2002) ("Legal theorists too often tend to exalt private
ordering as perfect and denigrate public rules as incompetent, corrupt, or both. My empirical exploration does
not reveal a perfectly functioning contractual system, a fact that advocates of private ordering will have to
come to terms with.'"). For a general critique of private legal systems, see Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, Two
Remarks on the Property-RightsLiterature,66 Rev. Econ. Stud. 139 (1999).
107. Corporate law's enabling statutes engender a similar problem. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A.
McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism 2 (European Corp. Governance Inst. Working
Paper No. 23/2004 & Geo. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 606481, 2004) (available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=606481) ("Externalities do occur because Delaware's strategy structurally favors
management on allocational questions."). Of course, businesses can also impose externalities on other
stakeholders such as employees, customers, and communities. See e.g. Kent Greenfield, September 11th and
the End of Historyfor CorporateLaw, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1409, 1419 (2002) ("Because the law largely stands
aside in the formation of the corporate governance 'contract,' the parties with power, the shareholders and
managers, can largely agree to whatever arrangement will benefit them. They can externalize the cost of the
contract onto those who have less power to do anything about it."). It is debatable, however, whether imposing
broader stakeholder analysis onto fiduciary law is a productive endeavor. See Dibadj, supra n. 41.
108. See e.g. Mitchell, supra n. 101, at 477 ("Among the conditions are the requirements that the parties
have relatively equal information, or access thereto, and have relatively equal bargaining power, and that each
of the parties expects the others to pursue their respective interests.").
109. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461, 1463 (1989)
(footnote omitted); see id. at 1469-70; see also Vestal, supra n. 55, at 242 (noting that contractarianism
"assumes that the participants possessed perfect knowledge and maintains that the contractual allocation of
power, even with its hidden consequence, represented the bargained-for understanding").
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bargaining is often characterized by informality and misguided optimism." 0 These
oversights are symptomatic of not paying sufficient attention to the messy reality of how
human beings actually behave. 1I As William Bratton observes by applying the tools of
game theory to bargains,
the contractarian description has a significant shortcoming. It gives us ex ante contracts
across-the-board and thereby makes corporate governance entirely contractual without
providing a description of the process by which corporate actors make contracts. It avoids
the necessity of a theory of bargaining with two assumptions-bargaining is relatively
cheap and competition will force parties to bargain their way into efficient arrangements.
The mandatory/enabling discussion devolved on the weakness of these assumptions,
concluding that information asymmetries, along with shareholder collective action and
rational apathy problems, prevent effective bargaining and make certain actual contracts
suspect. 112
Bratton concludes "the game theoretic firm implies a new endorsement of the traditional
13
dual justification of fiduciary law."1
The insights of game theory, moreover, extend far beyond the initial bargaining
stage. Put simply, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to anticipate ex ante how
the relationships within a business enterprise will evolve. At a very basic level, fiduciary
law exists partly because firms cannot be modeled simply as basic contracts 114 or simple
agency relationships. 115 Additionally, fiduciary law protects against the behavioral

110. See e.g. Robert W. Hillman, PrivateOrdering within Partnerships,41 U. Miami L. Rev. 425, 434-35
(1987).
111. Chicago School law and economics posits rational actors magically going about the business of
maximizing utility. See e.g. Ron Harris, The Uses of History in Law and Economics 665 (Boalt Working
Papers in Pub. L. Paper 21, 2003) (available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/boaltwp/21) (Chicagoans' "research
did not focus on studying the behavior of individuals, and the behavior of societies and basic social structures
and trends was entirely beyond the scope of their research agenda."). For a step toward organizational
behavioral economics, see Dibadj, supran. 59.
112. Bratton, supra n. 59, at 154; cf. Hillman, supra n. 110, at 442 ("Partnership law is not, as many believe,
simply the 'law of the agreement.' The first step in evaluating the effectiveness of bargaining at the inception
of a partnership is to recognize the limitations inherent in even serious attempt-, to develop an adequate
partnership agreement.").
113. Bratton, supra n. 59, at 153; see also id. at 154 ("Game theory implies a more thoroughgoing process
challenge. It insists that bargaining processes often shape contractual results.").
114. As I have argued elsewhere, firms are akin to a "messy smorgasbord of incomplete contracts." Dibadj,
supra n. 59, at 1505 (emphasis in original).
115. Interestingly, some writers analogize directly from agency law to advocate the primacy of contract in
partnership law. See e.g. J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, and Partnerships:
The Bargain Principleand the Law ofAgency, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 439, 441 (1997) ("[T]he law of agency
provides a compelling analogy for the use of the bargain principle in the context of defining fiduciary
relationships among partners." (footnote omitted)). A careful reading of agency law, however, suggests
otherwise: "Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of
the principal in all matters connected with his agency." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387 (1958).
However, the law of agency is referring to individual transactions that might present a conflict, not broad
ex ante waivers. As the commentary to the new draft emphasizes:
[A]n agreement that contains general or broad language purporting to release an agent in advance
from the agent's general fiduciary obligation to the principal is not likely to be enforceable. This is
because a broadly-sweeping release of an agent's fiduciary duty may not reflect an adequately
informed judgment on the part of the principal; if effective, the release would expose the principal
to the risk that the agent will exploit the agent's position in ways not foreseeable by the principal at
the time the principal agreed to the release.
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.06 cmt. b (6th tent. draft 2005). This stance is in marked contrast to the
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quirks of economic actors. 116 Noting that "complete contractual protection ex ante is not
cost effective because of informational asymmetries and a long list of possible future
relational problems," 1 7 Bratton warns that
[b]usiness relationships that depend on a motivational balance between self-interest and
honor will have a potential for instability over time. This cannot be avoided through
contract, because ex ante welfare calculations will never adequately identify or solve
ex post problems of unreciprocal treatment. Given this, normative interventions undei the
fiduciary rubric that enforce a commitment to honor another's interests play a coordinating
role. 118
Scholars such as Eisenberg 119 and Robert Hillman 120 echo this crucial point. As one
commentator points out in the specific context of fiduciary waivers, "[e]ven if the waiver
were in good faith at the time of granting, no person can foresee the extent of the
resulting potential injury."' 121 Unfortunately, idealistic and static analysis is a hallmark
trait of neoclassical law and economics.122
2.

Transactions and Institutions

Another major shortcoming of contractarian economic analysis is its dismissal of

commentary in RUPA which states: "It is not necessary that the agreement be restricted to a particular
transaction. That would require bargaining over every transaction or opportunity, which would be excessively
burdensome. The agreement may be drafted in terms of types or categories of activities or transactions, but it
should be reasonably specific." RUPA § 103 cmt. 4; cf Dickerson, supra n. 2, at 122; Eisenberg, supra n. 109,
at 1470 ("[S]hareholder approval of a specific conflict-of-interest transaction usually does not present the
dangers of systematically underinformed consent and exploitation, because the approval relates to a specific
event rather than to an unknowable future.").
116. See e.g. Frankel, supra n. 5, at 824 ("Acknowledging the frailty of human nature, courts fashion
preventive rules to deter the fiduciary from abusing his power." (footnote omitted)).
117. Bratton, supra n. 59, at 160; see also Miller, supra n. 37, at 29 ("A purely contractual approach ignores
the reality of doing business on an ongoing basis.").
118. Bratton, supra n. 59, at 168; cf J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation:
A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close CorporationProblem, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1977)
("Whether the parties adopt special contractual arrangements is much less important than their ability to sustain
a close, harmonious relationship over time.").
119. See Eisenberg, supra n. 109, at 1465 ("It is almost impossible to deal adequately with this potential for
ex post opportunism by ex ante contracting.").
120. As Hillman notes:
But business governance is far more dynamic than a limited list of bargaining issues would suggest.
Individuals establishing a venture make certain assumptions concerning the subsequent course of
their business and the relationships likely to be developed between the participants. In so doing,
they view the future largely from the perspective of the present. Although the better partnership
agreements attempt to anticipate change, the degree to which any agreement reflecting a bargain at a
defined point in time can do this is open to question.
Hillman, supra n. 110 (footnote omitted), at 435; see also Hillman, supran. 93, at 186.
121. Dickerson, supra n. 2, at 155; see also Davis, supra n. 3, at 78 ("[L]eaving the principal to cope ex ante
with the risk of the fiduciary's unmitigated opportunism poses various problems."); Vestal, supra n. 17, at 540
("[T]he drafters' contractarian response institutes a static and inflexible regime of partnership law, one
admittedly unable to cope with the varied and changing circumstances of partnerships, and then relies upon the
participants to opt out." (footnote omitted)).
122. In antitrust, for example, the Areeda-Turner test posits that a price is predatory only if it is below the
producer's marginal cost. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, PredatoryPricing and Related Practices
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 732-33 (1975). This influential analysis, however,
while insightful in its day, is static and does not consider pricing and output over time. See Dibadj, supra n. 66,
at 766-67.
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transaction costs and institutional realities. A standard move in the Chicago School
repertoire is to assume a world of zero transaction costs 123 and then argue that in such a
world bargaining via private contract is ideal. Conventional law and economics
selectively relies on the so-called Coase Theorem to support its position 24-much to
R.H. Coase's own repeated chagrin. 125 Unfortunately, transaction costs cannot be
conveniently assumed away. The link to fiduciary duties is straightforward and relates to
the limitations of bargaining discussed above-"Courts supply fiduciary duties as default
rules to reduce the costs associated with providing the fiduciary with incomplete
instructions."' 126 In other words, fiduciary law can be viewed "as' 12a 7low transactions cost
alternative to ad hoc bargaining between fiduciary and principal."
A problem that closely parallels ignoring transaction costs is paying insufficient
attention to the institutions in which economic activity occurs. Contractarians simply
argue
[t]he antiwaiver argument is a harder sell in most closely held unincorporated firms in
which terms are often negotiated or voted on face-to-face and approved unanimously.
Fiduciary waivers in unincorporated firms closely resemble the sort of "real"
contracts that
128
anticontractarians have held out as models in the public corporation debate.
However, this analysis ignores a number of "vulnerabilities" 129 that a fiduciary can
exploit. To begin with, unincorporated associations-unlike public corporations-lack a
ready capital market than can provide an "exit" strategy. 13013 They
also often represent a
1
large, undiversified portion of a partner or member's assets.
There are also other institutional risks. Different unincorporated associations

123. Transaction costs include "search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and
enforcement costs." Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & Econ. 141, 148 (1979).
124. The Theorem postulates that "[i]t
is always possible to modify by transactions on the market the initial
legal delimitation of rights. And, of course, if such market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of
rights will always take place if it would lead to an increase in the value of production." R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 15 (1960).
125. Coase has been blunt in his critique of the use his theorem has been put to, lamenting that the "world of
zero transaction costs, to which the Coase Theorem applies, is the world of modem economic analysis, and
economists therefore feel quite comfortable handling the intellectual problems it poses, remote from the real
world though they may be." R.H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law 15 (U. Chi. Press 1988) (emphasis
added).
126. Smith, supra n. 7, at 1428 (footnote omitted).
127. Davis, supra n. 3, at 21; see also Bratton, supra n. 59, at 161 ("Since the corporation is a long-term
relational contract that must cover all future states of the world, and costs prevent ex ante negotiation of these
terms, judicial intervention ex post promotes efficiency by supplying the necessary terms."); Coffee, supra
n. 97, at 970 ("[A]ny internal contracting process that sought to design a privatized substitute for the derivative
action would have to write an extremely detailed contract and would have to develop and rely upon largely
untested procedures."); Hillman, supran. 110, at 448.
128. Ribstein, supra n. 57, at 550 (footnote omitted).
129. See Dickerson, supra n. 2.
130. The fact that a partnership is easily dissolvable has conflicting implications. On the one hand, some
argue that "[i]nterests in partnerships are highly liquid because any partner has the ability to dissolve the firm at
any time." Hetherington & Dooley, supra n. 118, at 3. However, it is important to bear in mind that the
"reality departs from the theory.., when a dominant partner is able to use dissolution as a means of capturing
firm value without compensation to other partners." Hillman, supra n. 93, at 187. In other words, the flip side
of having the right to exit is the risk of hold up by an unscrupulous partner.
13 1. Hillman, supra n. 93, at 179 ("The participants' investments in their firms often are substantial,
nondiversified, and illiquid.").
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exhibit different additional vulnerabilities.
General partnerships can be formed
inadvertently, 132 and partners "have unlimited personal liability for obligations of the
partnership." 133 In addition, "[e]very partner (unlike a stockholder) by law has broad
apparent authority to bind the partnership.... Partnership fiduciary duties similarly
derive from the intertwined obligations and management rights that arise from each
partner's status as both an agent and a principal., 134 Additionally, LPs necessarily
135
present the dangers inherent in the separation of management and ownership.
For their part, LLPs and LLCs, depending on how they are structured, can also
separate "insider" managers from vulnerable "outside" investors. Interestingly, the great
irony is that shareholders in close corporations136 the corporate entities to which LLPs
and LLCs most closely resemble1 3 7-- enjoy greater protections than participants in
unincorporated associations. After all, the duty of loyalty in corporate law, at least
nominally, is not waivable. 138 Even beyond the usual protections afforded public
shareholders, there is a long tradition of heightened concern for minority shareholdters in
close corporations. 139 Far from echoing these concerns, the uniform laws and Delaware
statutes for unincorporated associations belittle the duty of loyalty. 140 This posture is, to
132. Dickerson, supra n. 40, at 434-35 ("A person can have the unlimited personal liability of a general
partner without ever having had the subjective intent to form a partnership.").
133. Smith, supra n. 7, at 1484.
134. Paula J. Dailey, The Misguided Doctrine of Stockholder Fiduciary Duties, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 175,
187-88 (2004) (footnote omitted); see also Mary Siegel, FiduciaryDuty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29
Del. J. Corp. L. 377, 438 (2004) ("While all investors in small business associations are interdependent to some
extent, agency powers and personal liability make the partnership unique among business associations.").
135. See e.g. Kleinberger, supra n. 24, at 632 ("ULPA (2001) provides a blueprint for a manager-dominated
enterprise in which passive investors depend on and generally defer to the manager." (footnote omitted)).
136. As one commentator notes, "[a] close corporation is a business organization typified by a small number
of stockholders, the absence of a market for the corporation's stock, and substantial shareholder participation in
the management of the corporation." Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression and "'FairValue": Of
Discounts, Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the Close Corporation, 54 Duke L.J. 293, 299 (2004) (footnote
omitted).
137. In particular, both close corporations and unincorporated associations tend to be smaller entities where
investors cannot exit since there is no public market for the securities. See Hillman, supra n. 93, at 178-79.
Moreover, minority shareholders in close corporations closely mirror partners or members who do not make
management decisions. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra n. 118, at 4-5. Hetherington and Dooley continue:
Even if the minority shareholder appreciates the risks of future dissension and attempts to protect
his interest from its effects, bargaining for adequate contractual protections is no easy matter. Given
the limitations of human foresight and knowledge, any attempt to describe the majority's duties and
obligations precisely is likely to leave the minority vulnerable to some overlooked form of
exploitation while, at the same time, seriously impairing the efficiency of the firm by fettering
management.
Id.at 37 (footnote omitted).
138. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7); infra n. 173 and accompanying text.
139. See e.g. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975); Smith v.
Atlantic Properties,Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. 1981). For a critique of this line of cases, see Siegel,
supra n. 134. At the other extreme, some commentators argue that given the illiquidity of investments in close
corporations, even fiduciary duties are not enough protection for minority shareholders. See Hetherington &
Dooley, supra n. 118, at 6 ("[W]e offer a model statutory provision requiring the majority to repurchase the
minority's interest at the request of the latter and subject to appropriate safeguards.").
140. For instance, as Claire Moore Dickerson points out,
ULLCA fails in the bigger picture. It has created a standard of performance for members of an LLC
that is even lower than the standard currently in place for the owners in the traditional business
entity having limited liability, the corporation. Further, it does so in a context where tax
considerations limit the number of owners, thereby increasing the vulnerability of the owners who
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put it mildly, curious.
In sum, contractarianism ignores externalities, assumes perfect bargaining within a
static analytic framework, and slights transaction costs and institutional analysis.
Contract cannot provide a coherent foundation upon which to base the laws of
As one observer points out with some humor,
unincorporated associations.
contractarians have "the tendency to push their mode of analysis... far beyond its limits
and to group more phenomenon under, and claim more uses for, a single analytical
construct than does the Vegamatic shill on the carnival midway ('It slices, it
dices. . . . )." 141142 Analysts must not forget that "[t]he assumptions we make in this
debate matter."
C.

Weak Policy

Beyond its confused doctrinal foundations and outworn economics, the
transformation from loyalty into contract reflects weak public policy. It ignores the role
of tradition, trust, and social norms. Instead, it offers the illusory allure of legal
formalism.
1.

Slighting Tradition, Trust, and Social Norms

The contractarian mantra is to extol the autonomy of contracting parties to the
detriment of broader social institutions. 143 This position, however, ignores the role of
tradition as a source of law. As Robert Clark points out in his study of contractual, elite,
and traditional legal sources, 144 "contractualists analyzing legal institutions.., tend not
to acknowledge that noncontractual bases of legal rules could be both legitimate and
important."' 14 5 In particular, "[t]raditions greatly reduce the very high costs of repeated

lack control.
Dickerson, supra n. 40, at 462. It remains to see to what extent the courts will read these statutes literally.
Cf Miller, supra n. 37, at 73 ("In light of the long-standing history of shareholder dissension in the close
corporation context, and the abuse which has occurred in the context of limited partnerships, judicial
intervention will invariably be needed to mediate disputes among limited liability company members."); infra
nn. 174-175 and accompanying text.
141. Branson, supra n. 58, at 94.
142. Vestal, supra n. 40, at 534.
143. See Ribstein, supra n. 57, at 565 ("In fact, an external decisionmaker probably cannot do a better job
than the contracting parties in determining the costs and benefits of waiver in particular circumstances."
(footnote omitted)).
144. Clark provides a taxonomy:
In contractual rule making, the parties subject to a particular set of rules create them for
themselves, by their agreement.

In elite rule making, rules are made for the subject parties by other persons who consider
themselves to be experts, leaders, or persons in authority.
Traditional rules are rules imposed by prior generations of rule makers (who were usually, but not
necessarily, elites).
Robert C. Clark, Contracts,Elites, and Traditions in the Making of CorporateLaw, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1703,
1712 (1989).
145. Id.at 1746.
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discovery, learning, and rational decisionmaking by individuals" 146-after all,
the optimal control of discretionary power possessed by those who act on behalf of
others.., is as old and basic as human nature itself, and certain general principles evolved
such as the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, have been a long
to cope with that problem,
14 7
time in the making.

Overemphasis on contract also erodes trust. 14 8 It is important to remember that
"contract is the language of autonomy. Thus contract begins from a situation of distrust,
because one is presumed to rely upon one's self for protection; one's contracting partner
is, after all, indifferent to one's welfare."'149 By contrast, the duty of loyalty, as its name
might imply, is about fostering trust. Trust inherently creates an ambiance that "reduces
15
0 and leads to stable business
uncertainty in an enormously complex world"
151 Contract does not. 152
relationships over time.
Contractarians will no doubt protest the importance placed on tradition and trust.
After all, the argument goes: "Don't these represent extralegal norms?" 153 The response,
as I have developed in detail elsewhere, is that the law is, in part, a device to foster
positive social norms and repel antisocial ones. 154 Fiduciary duties necessarily bring
with them a moral component. 155 We choose to abandon these characteristics at our
own peril. 156 As Mitchell notes, "[t]he debate really is about the way we, as a society,
believe that people can and should conduct themselves in business relationships and the
extent to which we are willing to use the law to encourage and, if necessary, compel

146. Id. at 1731. Framed in economic parlance, tradition can reduce transaction costs.
147. Id. at 1745; cf Davis, supra n. 3, at 22 ("Where the regime is one of standardized form, data is available
from the experiences of countless other relationships operating under a comparable framework."); Eisenberg,
supra n. 109, at 1466.
148. The effect is particularly pernicious when contractarianism is combined with procedural maneuvers.
As Mitchell writes,
It]here are two separate, but ultimately related, legal causes of the erosion of trust in our society:
an overreliance in our legal system on procedural fairness, and an increased reliance on the law of
contract ....
As the fairness test has evolved, it permits corporate fiduciaries to profit from
self-dealing with the corporation as long as the fiduciaries can demonstrate that they have followed
processes which themselves are formally fair, regardless of the actual outcome.
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract.Process., in Progressive CorporateLaw, supra n. 56, at 185, 186; see
also Dickerson, supra n. 2, at 155.
149. Mitchell, supra n. 148, at 186.
150. Mitchell, supra n. 101, at 480.
151. See id.
152. Cf Miller, supra n. 53, at 1619 ("The contractarian model... fail[s] to consider the human
relationships that develop in privately owned businesses.").
153. See e.g. Ribstein, Are PartnersFiduciaries?supra n. 60, at 233-35.
154. See Dibadj, supra n. 59; see also Claire Moore Dickerson, Cycles and Pendulums: Good Faith, Norms,
and the Commons, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 399, 412 (1997) ("If norms were entirely self-enforcing, laws to
enforce them would be redundant."); Miller, supra n. 53, at 1647-48 ("A broader statement of duties may
better reflect society's norms of ethical behavior than a narrower formulation of responsibilities."
(footnote omitted)). For a general discussion of how law can help foster rather than hinder trust, see Frank B.
Cross, Law and Trust, 93 Geo. L.J. 1457 (2005).
155. See e.g. Frankel, supra n. 5, at 830 ("This moral theme is an important part of fiduciary law. Loyalty,
fidelity, faith, and honor form its basic vocabulary." (footnote omitted)); Hillman, supra n. 110, at 456 ("There
is a moral theme to the concept of fiduciary responsibilities." (footnote omitted)).
156. See Vestal, supra n. 40, at 497.
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' 157
them to conform to that level of conduct."

2.

The Allure of Legal Formalism

It should hopefully be apparent by now that fiduciary duties are borne of common
sense and realism:
[F]iduciaries occupy neither the position of parents nor that of priests. Fiduciaries are
required to identify with the interests of entrustors only to the extent that the fiduciaries
exercise dominion over the entrustors or theirproperty, and to a lesser extent, with respect
to the quality of their services.... The "goodness" expected of fiduciaries consists of
refraining from taking what is not theirs, without permission. Fiduciaries must meet the
obligations even
if the entrustors do not police their activities. This is honesty,
15 8
not altruism.
Contrary to what contractarians might have us believe, the fiduciary tradition does not
represent some romantic, antiquated ideal. Instead, it expresses pragmatism:
Business people and lawyers understand the "smell test" and know that the traditional
fiduciary duties make it risky to cut comers too closely. Far from being naively
serve to guide the parties to a standard of behavior that reduces
aspirational, those duties
59
the need to monitor. 1
As Mitchell writes, fiduciary duty "is an attitude, not a rule, 160 to "provide a legal
incentive for the parties to get along by forgoing opportunistic conduct."' 161 Contrast
this perspective with that of the contractarians, who view business associations as a
series of highly formal arrangements, reminiscent of nineteenth-century contract theory,
162
where form trumps function.
At the broadest level, the contractarian push in the law of
unincorporated associations is part of a general movement in law and economics,
epitomized by James Buchanan's pioneering work, to lionize contract at the expense of
public law. Buchanan's core postulate is that "economics comes closer to being a
'science of contract' than a 'science of choice,"' 163 where the "unifying principle
Why the allure?

becomes gains-from-trade,

not [social) maximization." 164

The consequence of a

157. Mitchell, supra n. 1, at 1725.
158. Frankel, supra n. 61, at 1228-29 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted); see also Bratton, supra n. 59,
at 144 (Cardozo in Meinhard "represents the wise common law judge whose state-imposed standard of honor
holds out no serious threat to ordinary money-making pursuits.").
159. Dickerson, supra n. 2, at 156.
160. Mitchell, supra n. 1, at 1696 (quoting Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903, 912 (Or. App. 1989)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
161. Mitchell, supra n. 101, at 481.
162. Cf Coffee, supra n. 97, at 937 ("One ironic generalization seems justified about those economists who
view the firm as a private contract: they often seem to ignore modem contract law in favor of an almost
nineteenth century, stereotypical notion of what contract law permits."); Dickerson, supra n. 2, at 152 ("It may
also be that to import contractarian theories into partnership law today is analogous to using formalist concepts
in the 1930s.").
163. James M. Buchanan, A ContractarianParadigmfor Applying Economic Theory, 65 Am. Econ. Rev.
225, 229 (1975).
164. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also James M. Buchanan, Contractarian Political Economy and
Constitutional Interpretation, 78 Am. Econ. Rev. 135 (1988). In many respects, contractarianism is a bold
extension of Hayek's argument that given the decentralization of knowledge in society, dispersed
decision-making loci, namely markets, are the preferred means of allocating resources. See F.A. Hayek, The
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contract-based society, with its concomitant over-reliance on market allocations 165-as
opposed to a fiduciary one-is plain. As Frankel reminds us, "[u]nlike status and
contract societies, a fiduciary society emphasizes not personal conflict and domination
among individuals, but cooperation and identity of interest pursuant to acceptable but
imposed standards.... A contract society values freedom and independence highly, but
it provides little security for its members." 166 The desire to waive the duty of loyalty,
then, is simply a specific manifestation of a broader ethic.
There is an additional fascinating twist to the story. The contractarian push has
come, by and large, not from the courts, but from the legislatures. As just one prominent
example, when the Delaware Supreme Court in Gotham Partners suggested that
fiduciary duties could not be entirely eliminated, 167 the Delaware legislature promptly
passed amendments in 2004 allowing the elimination of the duty of loyalty. 168 When it
comes to courts, even contractarians admit that "[t]here has always been a tension
regarding the extent to which a partner's fiduciary duty of loyalty can be varied by
agreement, as contrasted with the other partners' consent to a particular and known
breach of duty."' 16 9 Judges might give greater weight to fiduciary law than the text of the
part a recognition that
statutes might otherwise suggest because of tradition 7-in
task to which
analyzing relations of dependency is an inherently context-dependent
17
fiduciary law has been applied and developed over time. 1

Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519 (1945).
165. See e.g. Herbert Hovenkamp, Knowledge about Welfare: Legal Realism and the Separation of Law and
Economics, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 805, 850 (2000) ("For the contractarian, markets are unambiguously the preferred
way to allocate resources (when the social contract is negotiated, markets receive unanimous consent), and the
government intervenes only in the extraordinary case where everyone agrees that intervention is in order.").
166. Frankel, supra n. 5, at 802.
167. Gotham Partners,LP v. Hallwood Realty Partners,LP, 817 A.2d 160, 168 (Del. 2002). Even opinions
that squarely espouse contractarianism contain hints of ambivalence. See e.g. Miller v. Am. Real Estate
Partners, LP, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 116 at *29 (Del. Ch. Sept. 6, 2001) ("I conclude that the Partnership
Agreement fails to preclude the operation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty with sufficient clarity, even in
situations when the General Partner has the contractual power to act in its sole discretion."); McConnell v. Hunt
Sports Enters., 725 N.E.2d 1193, 1216 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. 1999) ("In general terms, members of limited
liabilitycompanies owe one another the duty of utmost trust and loyalty. However, such general duty in this
case must be considered in the context of members' ability, pursuant to the operating agreement, to compete
with the company." (emphasis added)).
168. See supra pt. II.B. For more on these amendments, see Ribstein, supra n. 24, at 952-53.
169. Ribstein, supra n. 24, at 946 (quoting RUPA § 103 cmt. 4) (internal quotation marks omitted);
cf Miller, supra n. 53, at 1613 ("The primary message of this Article is that the courts are central to all LLC
models, including Delaware's contractarian paradigm, and are leading the way toward balancing the interest in
contractual freedom with the need to constrain opportunistic and deceptive conduct through the development of
a minimum mandatory core of acceptable business conduct.").
170. As Robert Clark points out:
Suppose a corporation attempts a charter amendment excusing directors and officers from the
judicially developed fiduciary duty of loyalty.
A traditionalist judge might respond [that] they do not feel right and, as I read the case law
precedents, fiduciary duties have generally been assumed by prior judges to be nonnegotiable.
Clark, supra n. 144, at 1740-41.
171. Daniel Kleinberger points out that "[fliduciary duty is context-sensitive, because dependency and
vulnerability form the duty's core raison detre." Kleinberger, supra n. 24, at 632 (footnote omitted).
For instance, "[a] restriction that passes statutory muster where the partners are genuinely co-equals may be
manifestly unreasonable where all but one partner have committed themselves to total dependence on that one
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A similar pattern has manifested itself in corporate law. When the Delaware
Supreme Court, in the famous Van Gorkom case, 1 72 found directors to be grossly
negligent under a duty of care analysis, the Delaware legislature passed § 102(b)(7),
allowing corporations to contract out of the duty of care, at least as to monetary
liability. 17 3 Moreover, when state legislatures adopted "safe harbor" statutes that allow
corporate managers to insulate themselves from liability for duty of loyalty violations
through procedural mechanisms and thereby immunizing them from any "fairness"
language of the statutes-continue to
inquiry, 174 many jurisdictions-despite the explicit 75
scrutinize the facts under a broad fairness analysis.1
Why would legislatures push contractarianism? It is important to remember that
legislatures themselves generally do not draft business laws. Committees of private
lawyers, often representing large firms, do. 176 This might help explain a seeming
incongruity in the new laws. As Allan Vestal notes, "[s]cholars generally agree that the
Revised Act should be written for partnerships that are small in size, closely held by
relatively unsophisticated individuals, and modestly capitalized.' 177 Yet, "certain
provisions of the Revised Act, such as the fiduciary duty sections, appear tailored to
larger, more affluent enterprises with relatively sophisticated participants." 178 Similarly,
Sandra Miller observes that a "narrower contract-oriented approach to fiduciary duties
may inappropriately serve the interests of the more affluent and may be unrealistic in
terms of the practical usage of the LLC by certain members of the business
community"179-after all, "the contractarian approach of relying on contractual
provisions to protect against opportunistic conduct may be more well suited to big
18
business than to the work-a-day world of small business." 0
Some scholars go even further. Mitchell asks whether
RUPA was drafted more to benefit lawyers by giving them a fail-safe backstop than to
benefit the parties themselves. Moreover, by severely limiting fiduciary obligation, RUPA
benefits sophisticated lawyers and their clients, not only allowing them to take advantage
of the weaker parties, but providing them with winning arguments in the case of
ambiguous drafting. 181

partner." Id. at 634; see also Miller, supra n. 37, at 51 ("From a statutory standpoint, the standards of conduct
applicable to limited partnerships are the same as those applicable to general partnerships. A review of the case
law, however, indicates a judicial willingness to protect limited partners from abuse by managing partners.").
172. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
173. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). This provision maintains, however, that the duty of loyalty
is mandatory.
174. E.g. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144; Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act. § 8.61 (3rd ed., ABA 2003).
175. E.g. Cooke v. Oolie, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 92 (Del. Ch. June 23, 1997); In re Wheelabrator
Technologies, 663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995); Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distribg., Inc.,
430 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1988); see also Bratton, supra n. 4, at 1088 ("Courts, however, have not read the [safe
harbor] statutes literally. They have consistently construed them to permit direct judicial review for fairness
despite disinterested-director approval." (footnote omitted)).
176. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Dibadj, supran. 41.
177. Vestal, supra n. 55, at 238 (footnote omitted).
178. Id. at 239.
179. Miller, supra n. 53, at 1646.
180. Id. at 1647.
181. Mitchell, supra n. 101, at 479.
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Similarly, Frankel points out that in a contractarian world, "[e]ntrustors must
expressly protect themselves by contracts-a bonanza to the legal profession-or else
their fiduciaries can use the entrusted property for their own benefit." 182 Mitchell's and
Frankel's words are reminiscent of a warning given by Justice Harlan Stone in the wake
of the excesses of the 1920s:
But when we know and face the facts we shall have to acknowledge that such departures
from the fiduciary principle do not usually occur without the active assistance of some
member of our profession, and that their increasing recurrence would have been impossible
but for the complaisance of a Bar, too absorbed in the workaday care of private interests to
take account of these events of profound import or to sound the warning that the profession
18 3
looks askance upon these, as things that "are not done."'

Might the current attack on the duty of loyalty be reconceptualized as a "regulatory
184
giving" from the legislatures to a small class of lawyers?
IV.

CONCLUSION

The law of unincorporated associations is undergoing a major shift. The uniform
laws, and to an even greater extent the Delaware statutes, seek to reduce dramatically,
if not eliminate, the fiduciary duty of loyalty. This transformation is part of a broader
trend toward treating business associations as mere contracts. 185 Unfortunately, the
rhetoric of contractarianism exhibits doctrinal confusion, outworn economics, and weak
policy.
The fiduciary principle has served partnership law well for over a century.
By contrast, the recurring scandals in corporate governance stem in large measure from
the unfortunate relaxation of fiduciary duties applicable to corporations. 18 6 As Justice
Stone reflected over seventy years ago:
I venture to assert that when the history of the financial era which has just drawn to a
close comes to be written, most of its mistakes and its major faults will be ascribed to the
failure to observe the fiduciary principle, the precept as old as holy writ, that "a man cannot
serve two masters."... Yet those who serve nominally as trustees, but relieved, by clever
legal devices, from the obligation to protect those whose interests they purport to represent,
corporate officers and directors who award to themselves huge bonuses from corporate
funds without the assent or even the knowledge of their stockholders, reorganization
committees created to serve interests of others than those whose securities they control,
financial institutions which, in the infinite variety of their operations, consider only last,
if at all, the interests of those whose funds they command, suggest how far we have
18 7
ignored the necessary implications of that principle.

182. Frankel, supra n. 61, at 1267.
183. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1934).
184. For a detailed discussion of the concept of a "regulatory giving," see Reza Dibadj, Regulatory Givings
and the Anticommons, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 1041 (2003).
185. See Dibadj, supra n. 59.
186. For a detailed discussion of the importance of fiduciary duties in corporate law and a case for their
reconstruction, see Dibadj, supra n. 41.
187. Stone, supra n. 183, at 8-9.
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Stone's words are at least as relevant today as they were in 1934.188 It would,
after all, stretch the imagination to argue that the perpetrators in the most recent slew of
corporate scandals were either careful or loyal. 189 In corporate law, the unintended
consequence of relaxing fiduciary duties has been to impose increasingly burdensome
190
layers of mandatory regulation to stem malfeasance-notably securities regulation
with mixed success. 191
The need for increasing layers of regulation may very well emerge to be even more
acute for unincorporated associations than for corporations. The great irony, of course,
is that cases imposing more robust fiduciary duties on corporate insiders would analogize
to the higher duties historically inherent upon partners. 192 Today, the situation is
precisely the opposite: at least nominally, corporate law still makes the duty of loyalty
mandatory, 19 3 whereas the new partnership laws are fighting hard to make it waivable.
Unsurprisingly, the law is already finding it necessary to impose layers of regulation to
compensate for eviscerated fiduciary duties. 194 Damage control has begun. 195 The
alternative is to embrace a strong duty of loyalty as a necessary "regulatory" adjunct to

private ordering.1

96

188. Some might be tempted to argue that corporate fiduciary duties are a bit quaint in an era increasingly
dominated by institutional shareholders. Quite the opposite is true. A pioneer in the world of investment
funds, John Bogle, warns
the radical change from an ownership society dominated by individual investors to an
intermediation society dominated by professional money managers and corporations has not been
accompanied by the development of an ethical, regulatory and legal environment that requires
trustees and fiduciaries, as agents, to act solely and exclusively in the interests of their principals.
John C. Bogle, Individual Stockholder, R.LP., Wall St. J. A16 (Oct. 3, 2005); see also Bratton, supra n. 4,
at 1085 ("[T]raditional fiduciary norms still play a vital role in corporate governance.").
189. See e.g. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Our CorporateFederalism and the Shape of Corporate
Law 25 (U. Pa. Inst. for L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 04-12 & N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Research Paper
No. 04-020, 2004) (available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=564685) (noting, as just
one example, how looting at Tyco represented a "classic self-dealing transaction by a corporate fiduciary").
190. See e.g. Dibadj, supra n. 41; Frankel, supra n. 61, at 1245 ("[T]he Securities Acts put market fiduciaries
and contract actors on such a level playing field by prohibiting waivers of rights under the Acts."
(footnote omitted)).
191. See Dibadj, supra n. 41; cf Eisenberg, supra n. 109, at 1524 ("It would be a normative mistake to think
that under prevailing circumstances... publicly held corporations would continue at their present level of
success if the legal constraints on traditional and positional conflicts that have contributed to that success
were removed.").
192. See e.g. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 ("[W]e hold that stockholders in the close corporation owe one
another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one
another." (footnotes omitted)); Hillman, supra n. 93, at 177; Siegel, supra n. 134, at 444-45.
193. E.g. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7); see supra n. 173 and accompanying text.
194. This has begun with the classification of LLC interests as securities, especially where there is separation
of management and ownership, as in manager-managed LLCs. See e.g. Cohen, supra n. 53, at 467 ("Unlike
piercing and fiduciary duty laws, security laws related to LLCs have been tested by the courts and arguments in
favor of regulation have defeated arguments in favor of freedom of private ordering.").
195. Cf Vestal, Disclosure Obligations,supra n. 22, at 1568 ("The failure of the contractarian revolution in
partnership law-if that is indeed what we are seeing-is another indication of more general dissatisfaction
with contractarian theory when the theory is applied to concrete legal problems."); Vestal, supra n. 17, at 553
("The most spectacular error of the Revised Act is its exclusion of the core fiduciary principle and the embrace
of its antipode.").
196. Cf Miller, supra n. 53, at 1652-53 ("Elastic concepts such as fiduciary duty are not out of place in a
system designed to enforce contractual expectations within the business entity, but rather are the very backbone
of our system of private ordering." (footnote omitted)).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol41/iss3/4

26

